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INTRODUCTION

The year 1991 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the United
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, 1 and the beginning of the Decade for the
Eradication of Colonialism. It was also the year in which the fragmentation of the Soviet Union became irreversible. And it was the
year in which independence movements worldwide, in Croatia, Slovenia, Eritrea and East Timor, accelerated promotion of their claims.
The catalyst for all these developments is the principle of self-determination. One could expect therefore that a principle so readily utilized
in the international arena would possess a definite meaning. This is
not the case. Current international law theory regarding self-determi• L.L.B with Honors Melbourne University; Senior Tutor in Law, Melbourne University; and Research Fellow, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies Melbourne University; formerly Research Officer to Counsel Assisting the Nauru Commission of Inquiry. An
earlier version of this paper was delivered in a joint seminar with Mr. Gerry Simpson at Melbourne University in September 1991. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and
assistance of Dr. Hilary Charlesworth.
1. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L323
(1960).
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nation is in a state of uncertainty and confusion. It is inconsistent
within itself, and it does not accord with state practice.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need to re-think the
principle of self-determination by establishing that an undesirable
level of uncertainty exists regarding the usage of the term, and to
show that a major cause of the confusion is due to the inadequacy of
conventional approaches. These objectives will be achieved by identifying and evaluating confticting approaches toward the meaning of
self-determination, proposing an explanation for why the debate has
evolved and suggesting which approach best serves the needs of the
international community.
Before analyzing the history of self-determination and how it
evolved to encompass the current view, it is important to consider
why it has become necessary to re-evaluate the term. As the paper
will focus on interpretations of what constitutes self-determination, it
is worth commenting at the outset that interpreting words, whether
legal or not, is by its nature an imprecise process. One method of
analyzing inconsistencies of meaning which arise in legal interpretation was proposed by Professor H.L.A. Hart. 2 Hart developed the
distinction between the "core" meaning of a legal concept, and its
"penumbra of uncertainty." Self-determination is a term which has a
wide penumbra of uncertainty. A number of inconsistent meanings
have been ascribed to the term.
The reason this confusion is critical is that it promotes an unstable international environment by failing to provide a consistent measure upon which groups can rely. In this volatile period so ubiquitous
a term should possess greater certainty than it presently does. Furthermore, what was once a nice academic debate threatens to jeopardize the potential the concept has for aiding international law dispute
resolution. In other words, the functional utility of the term is being
undercut by a confusion in the theory. International law is becoming
hamstrung by its own limitations. When President Bush hesitates
before recognizing as legitimate a call to independence by the people
of Lithuania, (a claim framed initially as a right to self-determination), his equivocation is based on the confusions and shortcomings of
international law theory. The point has been reached where, borrowing from Hart, the "penumbra of uncertainty" surrounding the con2. The distinction between a 'core of settled meaning' and a 'penumbra of cases' was
referred to in H.L.A. Hart, Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958),
and subsequently developed in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 - 50 (1st ed. 1961).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/4

2

Cass: Re-thinking Self-determination: A Critical Analysis of Current In

Rethinking Self-Determination

1992]

23

cept of self-determination is so pronounced that it obscures the term's
"core of settled meaning."
This problem assumes greater importance in the light of the increased reliance on the concept by indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in a variety of unsettled political situations. The
Commonwealth of Independent States, bargaining over nuclear stockpiles and struggling to suppress the dormant nationalist fervor of approximately 140 minority groups, probably represents the worst
danger. The threat of the breakup of the Canadian federal system
presents another. The civil war in Yugoslavia yet another.
It will be argued here that conventional theoretical approaches to
self-determination are inadequate insofar as they provide neither a description of, nor a prescription for, the behavior of states in international relations. At a time when an increasing number of claims are
being made by indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, not enclosed
within the parameter of classical, colonial boundaries, the disjunction
between theory and practice becomes critical.
It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a complete
history of self-determination or a complete discussion of its status,
which have been comprehensively covered elsewhere. 3 The following
two sections will, however, define self-determination in general terms
and provide a brief overview of the concept's status. Part III will
discuss the scope and content of self-determination. Specifically, the
conventional and controversial views of its scope will be set out. State
practices, opinio juris and textual and jurisprudential issues will be
examined to determine which view appropriately defines self-determination. This paper concludes with a proposal to avoid the uncertainty
created by the dissonance between state practice and the conventional
view of self-determination.
II.

SELF-DETERMINATION -

A.

A

BRIEF HISTORY

What Is Self-Determination?

President Woodrow Wilson, introducing the concept to the
League of Nations in 1919, described self-determination as "the right
of every people to choose the sovereign under which they live, to be
free of alien masters, and not to be handed about from sovereign to
3. See, e.g., MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE

(1982); A. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A
STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1973); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
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sovereign as if they were property. " 4
Subsequently, other writers described self-determination as a
right which arises when there is "international recognition of the
rights of the inhabitants of a colony to choose freely their independence or association with another state"s or when there is a "collective right of a people sharing similar objective characteristics to freely
determine their own form of government while further developing
their economic, social and cultural status. " 6
The definition was further elaborated regarding the manner in
which the right could be implemented. The right to self-determination can be exercised in one of three ways - integration, free association or independence - but whichever method is chosen, it is clear that
it is the process itself which is the "essential feature." 7
According to Judge Dillard, in a separate opinion in the Western
Sahara Case, "It is for people to determine the destiny of the territory
and not the territory the destiny of the people." 8 It will be demonstrated therefore that self-determination encapsulates three basic
ideas: 1) there has to be a group; 2) that group has to be concerned
about its political status; and 3) that group must be able to exercise its
own choice with regard to its political future.
Having reduced the concept for present purposes to these three
elements the next step is to identify areas of inconsistency in relation
to the term. Uncertainty exists at two levels. First, there is uncertainty surrounding the status of the concept of self-determination at
international law. Is it a principle of politics, a tool of secessionist
rhetoric, or has self-determination crystallized into a norm of international law? The second issue relates to the question of how to define
the group. To whom does a right of self-determination apply? Does
it apply only to groups within colonial boundaries, or all minorities
however encased? In other words, what exactly is the scope of the
term? The aim of this paper is to concentrate on the latter problem.
B.

History and Status

Self-determination, as a principle of international law, originated
4. Quoted in Eric M. Amberg, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an
Old Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 842 (1985).
5. Id. at 840 (quoting Professor Louis Henkin).
6. John A. Collins, Self Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE
W. RES. J . INT'L L. 137, 138 (1980).
7. Western Sahara Case, 1975 l.C.J. 12, para. 57 (Oct. 16).
8. Id. at 114 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
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following World War I with the development of the mandate9 system.10 According to Quincy Wright, the eventual aim of the mandate
system was to lead the territory under control to self-determination. 11
In the following two decades, the acceptance of the principle of selfdetermination was reflected by, inter alia, its incorporation into the
Soviet Constitution 12 and, most significantly, into article 1 of the
Charter of the United Nations. 13
In subsequent years, the United Nations' largest representative
body, the General Assembly, regularly invoked the concept in a series
of resolutions, the most important of which were passed in 196014 and
1970. 15 With the emergence of the Group of 77 during the mid-seventies, the concept of self-determination was elevated further on the
agenda of the United Nations. 16
Seeking to secure permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources in a new international economic order, the third world
countries emphasized self-determination, anti-colonialism, sovereign
equality, non-intervention, and the invalidity of unequal treaties in
their international affairs. 17
9. The mandate derived from Roman law notions under which property of certain peoples unable to manage their own affairs was placed under the control of a guardian. Sovereignty over the property remained with the ward. Grotius describes this situation as a
separation between "lordship" and "ownership." See 2 Huoo GROTIUS, ON THE LA w OF
WAR AND PEACE, Book I, 207.
10. The mandate system was devised by the League of Nations after the first World War,
as a humanitarian method of administering former colonies of the defeated powers. In 1947,
most colonies still under mandate were transferred to U.N. control as trust territories. Collins
notes a number of other factors which led to the emergence of the mandate concept including:
19th century nationalism; the American and French revolutions; World War I; and the formation of the League of Nations. See Collins, supra note 6, at 138 - 40.
11. QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 231 (1930).
12. Article 29 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted in
1917, stated that the USSR's relations with other states were based on, inter alia, "the equal
rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny." Collins, supra note 6, at 140
(citing KONST. SSSR art. 29 (1917)).
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
14. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L323 (1960); G.A. Res.
1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1966).
15. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1970).
16. The Group called on the international community to establish a New International
Economic Order (N.1.E.0.). The combined influence of the developing, third world and Soviet
interests, acting as a bloc, altered voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly, and, at a
more important structural level, changed the agenda of the Assembly. See generally ROBERT
F. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY
OF THE CHARTER OF EcONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (1979).
17. Amberg, supra note 4, at 840 - 41.
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The signing of two major Covenants of international law in
1966, 18 and subsequent decisions of the International Court of Justice19 (ICJ) further endorsed the concept. As a result, self-determination became, according to some, "the pre-emptory norm of
international law. "20
At the same time, the concept itself remained "highly controversial. "21 The nature of the controversy revolved around two inter-related issues - what was the status of the concept, and what did it
include within its scope? This section will concentrate on the former
point, but in order to do so, it is first necessary to identify three methods of approaching the status issue. This clarification is required because assumptions regarding status clearly inform the discussion as to
what is included within the concept of self-determination. The definition of the term self-determination will depend, to an extent, on the
status ascribed to it. If the notion is viewed as lex ferenda, it may be
acceptable to tolerate some uncertainties of meaning. If, however,
self-determination is lex /ata, some suggest that it may be only a limited concept which has achieved this status. This paper is based on
the premise that the concept is lex /ata, but that a narrow definition of
self-determination is inappropriate. In other words, the notion of selfdetermination has achieved the status of a norm of international law,
and furthermore, the scope of its application is broadening.
There are, broadly, three ways to view the question of status.
The first approach attacks the very notion of self-determination. It
claims that the concept is vague, ill-defined and lacking in legal content ~ a concept of "policy and morality" 22 rather than positive law.
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Covenants].
19. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 l.C.J. 16
(June 21) (advisory opinion) [hereinafter Namibia Case]; Western Sahara Case, supra note 7.
Compare these decisions with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
some fifty years earlier, in the Asland Islands Case, L.N.O.J. Special Supp. No. 3, 3 (1920),
where it held that positive international law did not recognize the right of national groups to
separate themselves from the state of which they formed a part by a simple expression of a
wish, any more than it recognized the right of other states to claim such a separation.
20. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
21. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 88 (1988).
22. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 593 (3d ed.
1979). Brownlie notes that this approach, which he does not share, was assumed by western
scholars. Collins states that this school of thought views the concept as "legally intangible,
ambiguous, problematical, and only partially applicable . . . self-determination is in practice
unnecessary and invalid." Collins, supra note 6, at 145.
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A second group, characterized by Schwarzenberger, says, "self-determination has great potency, but [is] not part and parcel of international customary law." 23
The third school assumes that self-determination is part of international law, but considers there to be disagreement as to the content
of the concept. Thus, Brownlie in 1979 stated, "The present position
is that self-determination is a legal principle . . . . Its precise ramifications in other contexts are not yet worked out. " 24
For present purposes, the view put forward by Brownlie is
adopted on the basis of the sources of international law as listed in
article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ2 5 and interpreted by the court in
the Nicaragua Case. 26 In the court's view, "the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice
and opinio juris of States. " 27
Evidence of state practice can be found in a range of sources.
This includes: 1) the decolonization process of over seventy states
since 1946; 2) explicit recognition by the member states of the U.N. of
the right to self-determination by particular groups such as the
Namibian and Palestinian people; and 3) a growing number of statements by the international community encouraging the acceptance of
the validity of claims by peoples ranging from the Yugoslav republics,28 to the Baltics, 29 to East Timor. 30 Examples of state practice are
more comprehensively examined in the context of the scope of self23. Quoted in DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 95
(3d ed. 1983).
24. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 595.
25. Article 38 provides that the ICJ shall apply international conventions, international
custom as evidence of general practice, general principles of law, and, as a subsidiary means,
judicial decisions and teachings of qualified publicists. See Statute of the International Court
of Justice, art. 38 appended to the U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986
l.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
27. Id. para. 183.
28. As of this writing, the United States (The Age, July 4, 1991), Britain (The Age, July 5,
1991), Germany (The Age, July 5, 1991), the European Community (The Age, July 4, 1991)
and Australia (The Age, July 5, 1991) have indicated their readiness to accept the Slovenian
and Croatian claims. See also Mary Curtius, US, Allies Eye Halting Arms to Yugoslavia; Discuss Recognizing Republics if Federal Army Won't Withdraw, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1991, at
1.
29. See for example statements by the United States and Australia calling on the former
Soviet Union to recognize the Lithuanian Parliament's declaration of independence. The Age,
March 3, 1991. See also Warren Strobel, Bush Bolsters Ties to Ba/tics, WASH. TIMES, May 13,
1991, at A7.
30. Question of East Timor, G.A. Res. 3730, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 97,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/30 (1982).
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determination, 31 their purpose here being merely to demonstrate that
such evidence exists.
Since the Nicaragua Case, it is clear that the second element of
the test from that case, evidence of opinio juris, may be deduced from
U.N. General Assembly resolutions. 32 Resolutions 1514, 1541 and
2625 indicate a belief within the international community that selfdetermination is a part of customary international law. 33
Treaties, a further source of law under the Statute of the ICJ,
also confirm the existence of a legal right. The most representative
treaties of all time, the U.N. Charter (1947), 34 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 35 and the 1966 International Cove31. See discussion infra part III. A. 1.
32. HARRIS, supra note 23, at 99 (quoting the separate opinion of Judge Dillard in the
Western Sahara Case, supra note 7); Nicaragua Case, supra note 26, para. 188.
33. General Assembly Resolution 1S14 (1960), 1S41 (1966) and 262S (1970) all contain
passages similar in wording to article 1 of the International Covenants of 1966. G.A. Res.
1Sl4, supra note 14; G.A. Res. 1S41, supra note 14; G.A. Res. 262S, supra note lS. The first of
these, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples,
begins with the general proposition that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a "denial of fundamental human rights" and is "contrary to
the Charter of the United Nations." See G.A. Res. 1Sl4, supra note 14. It then states in
paragraph two that "all peoples have the right to self-determination" and that "immediate
steps" should be taken in Trust, Non-Self-Governing, and all other territories which have not
attained independence, to "transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories." Id. para. S.
General Assembly Resolution 1S41 outlines three possible methods of implementation: 1) independence; 2) free association; and 3) integration. See G.A. Res. 1S41, supra note 14. The
third General Assembly Resolution, the 1970 Declaration on The Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, re-asserted the primacy of
the principle of self-determination. See supra note 1S. It stated that "all peoples have the right
to freely determine without external interference, their political status." Id.
34. One of the purposes of the United Nations under article 1 of the Charter is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2) (emphasis added). The content
of the term was developed in article SS which promoted, inter alia, higher standards of living,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms based on the principle of self-determination. Id. art. SS. The use of the term self-determination in the Charter at articles 1 and SS is
persuasive evidence for recognizing that such a right existed at international law, although,
John Humphrey, the first head of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, argues that in 1947 self-determination in the Charter was merely a "political principle" and later
it became "something else." See HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 194 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984). The majority in the Western Sahara Case
disagreed and held that the inclusion of the principle in the Charter was indicative of its status
as law. See Western Sahara Case, supra note 7.
3S. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/777
(1948). One of the first actions of the newly created United Nations in 1948 was to begin
drafting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although self-determination is not specifically mentioned in that Declaration, many of the rights listed could be interpreted as being
elements of a right of self-determination. For instance, under the Declaration everyone has the
right to own property (art. 17), to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18) and to
take part in the government of their country (art. 21). More specifically, article lS provides
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nants, 36 whether viewed as a source of obligation derived from
mutually binding promises, or as methods of developing law, indicate
an acceptance of the concept. The inclusion of self-determination in
customary international law is reflected also in two major decisions of
the ICJ. 37
Ill.

SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE CONCEPT

Turning now to the question which is the subject of this paper,
the major issue to be addressed is, which groups are entitled to exercise a right to self-determination? The critical uncertainty here is
whether the right of self-determination attaches to all "peoples," 38 in
a literal sense, or only to those peoples within existing colonial
boundaries.

A.

The "Conventional" View

Broadly speaking, two views can be identified in the literature.
Harris, for example, believes that General Assembly Resolution 1514,
the first to deal comprehensively with self-determination, contemplates self-determination within existing boundaries. He argues,
pragmatically, that this limitation is necessary in the interests of international harmony. 39 Accordingly, ethnic minorities, not within definite colonial boundaries, are not entitled to exercise a right of selfthat everyone has the right "to a nationality" and that no one shall be "arbitrarily deprived" of
their nationality - two elements implicit in a right of self-determination. Id.
36. See Covenants, supra note 18. The Covenants are the work of the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, whose brief was to translate the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration into treaty law. These then form the basis of the major international obligation in
relation to self-determination. The Covenants came into force in 1976 and ratifications to date
number over 90 including Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the Federal Republic of Germany, the
German Democratic Republic and Japan. The United States is a signatory to both Covenants.
37. See Collins, supra note 6, at 145. In its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia Case, the
ICJ referred to the development of the law since 1920 as encapsulated in the U.N. Charter and
the General Assembly Resolutions of 1960 and noted that its interpretation of the principles of
law could not be "unaffected" by the "supervening half century." Namibia Case, supra note
19, para. 31. It concluded that in order to "faithfully discharge its functions" it could not
ignore these developments which left "little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred
trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned." Id. In the Western Sahara Case, the ICJ en<lorsed the abovementioned statements from the Namibia Case and
referred to Resolution 1541 :0f 1966, which it said "gave effect to the essential feature of the
right of self-determination." Western Sahara Case, supra note 7, para. 57.
38. The major U.N. instruments on self-determination, including the human rights Covenants and the resolutions of the General Assembly, provide that the right is possessed by all
"peoples." See supra notes 14, 15, and 18.
39. Harris states that "[t]he post-colonial states in particular have taken the view that it
would be too disruptive of international stability to allow self-determination within those
boundaries for minorities." HARRIS, supra note 23, at 96. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
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determination. Presumably therefore, under a strict reading utilizing
this approach many recent claims would fail. These would include
for example, claims by the peoples of the republics of the former Soviet Union40 against Moscow, by Croatia, 41 Slovenia42 and Macedonia43 against Yugoslavia, by the Serbian minority of Krajina against
Croatia, 44 the Bouganville claim against Papua New Guinea; 45 and
the list goes on. Query whether, according to this view, the claims of
the peoples of Baltic states who are arguably resident within pre-existing but dormant colonial boundaries would have any validity under
this approach.
In Australia, the view which strictly delimits the instances in
which self-determination can apply was adopted by the Australian
Law Reform Commission (A.L.R.C.), when it reported in 1986 on
Aboriginal Customary Law. The A.L.R.C. stated:
[A]dvocates for ethnic, indigenous or linguistic minorities sometimes
rely upon the principle or right of self-determination in international
law as a basis for claims to political or legal recognition. So far however, the principle has been confined in international practice to situations involving separate ('colonial') territories politically and legally
subordinate to an administering power. 46

The view espoused by the A.L.R.C. will be termed, for present purposes, the "conventional" view.

B.

The "Controversial" View

A different, and more controversial perspective is adopted by,
among others, Collins and Nanda. Professor Nanda's thesis is that
CREATION OF STATES AT INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 - 93 (1979); Wn..SON, supra note 21;
POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 3; Amberg, supra note 4, at 853.
40. For example, 98.3% of the 90.5% of Georgians who voted in a recent referendum
supported independence from Moscow. See THE AGE, Apr. 3, 1991. See also Elizabeth
Shogren, Soviet Georgians Flock to Polls to Vote for Secession, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at Al.
41. THE AGE, May 31, 1991. See also Andrew Borowiec, Serbia Plans to Form Small
Federation, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at AS.
42. THE AGE, Apr. 29, 1991. See also Borowiec, supra note 41.
43. THE AGE, Jan. 27, 1991. See also Borowiec, supra note 41.
44. THE AGE, Apr. 3, 1991. See also Balkan Woes, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 8,
1991, at 20.
45. For a discussion of the Origins of the Bouganville claim see THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept.
4, 1990. See also Papau New Guinea Prime Minister Namaliu on Bouganville Disturbances,
Xinhua General Overseas Newswire Service, Apr. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, ALLASI File.
46. A.L.R.C., REPORT No. 31 RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAW 128
(1986).
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the right of self-determination extends beyond the colonial context. 47
Although in order for the group to qualify for the right, they must
first satisfy a formal set of criteria. Moreover, Collins states it is only
political exigencies which have focused the right of self-determination
onto colonial territories. He argues that:
although political events have concentrated the UN's focus on colonial territories and the UN stands firm on the concept of territorial
integrity, the principle of self-determination should not be considered
strictly as a colonial right. 48
C.

Analysis: Which Approach to Self-Determination Is Appropriate?

It should be clear then that these two approaches, which have
been labelled conventional and controversial, are inconsistent. It will
be argued here that the latter is preferable; that in certain circumstances, the right to self-determination should be made available to
minority groups, as well as states, trusts and non-self governing territories. This proposition is based on the view that the controversial
theory of self-determination provides a more accurate explanation of
the shift in international state practice, as well as a workable prescription for the future. The discussion in this section will show that state
practice and the belief of states regarding that practice is in accordance with the controversial view. Moreover, the conventional view is
premised on an inherent logical inconsistency, and is unsustainable
from a jurisprudential perspective. The challenge for international
law is therefore not to exclude the ever-increasing list of claimants
because they do not match precisely with an outmoded theory, but to
find methods for assessing and evaluating the validity of claims according to realistic, functional and humanitarian measures.

1.

State Practice and Opinio Juris

The aim in this part of the paper is to outline the lack of correspondence between international legal theory and state practice and
consequently show that the exclusion of non-colonially based claims is
confusing and no longer appropriate.
Regardless of recent events in Europe and Asia, it is clear that
during the last fifty years there has already been a marked alteration
in the international community's perception of when the right to selfdetermination arises. A former head of the Human Rights section of
47. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 266 (1981).
48. Collins, supra note 6, at 153.
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the U.N., John Humphrey, argues that when self-determination was
introduced into the U.N. Charter, at the behest of the former Soviet
Union, ironically enough, it was clearly with colonial and mandated
territories in mind. 49 The 1960 Declaration is in accord with that interpretation, and this, he says, was also the prevailing view in the
U.N. 50 Humphrey then goes on, however, to acknowledge that the
General Assembly had no such limitation in mind when it sanctioned
the International Covenants in 1966. In his view, the General Assembly intended the word 'peoples' to extend beyond the colonial
context. 51
It is important to recall that colonial boundaries were the result
of specific historical circumstances. The desire for territorial or economic gain led to the establishment of arbitrary boundaries which
often cut across traditional spheres, although as Wilson notes, postcolonial states have in some cases come to accept these boundaries. 52
In many cases, the rearrangement of peoples into newer colonial units
produced an alliance of groups which had no reason, other than
colonialism, for existing. Currently these alliances, which often take
the form of federations, are coming under increasing pressure from
resurgent nationalism. Yugoslavia is clearly one of the more tragic
illustrations of this problem, where years after redrawing the physical
boundaries of the state, the psychological boundaries which define
various groups remain as strong as ever. Boundaries, therefore,
although "legal" in one sense, did not always reflect "practice," in the
sense of what peoples within those artificial parameters continued to
value. And whether or not post-colonial states accepted the imposed
boundaries, it still begs the question of whether these limitations
should be the critical yardstick by which to determine the validity of a
self-determillation claim.
More significantly, from the perspective of international law the49. Other commentators take a different view. For example, it has been suggested that
when the U.N. Charter was drawn up the U.N. Secretariat defined peoples as groups who may
or may not comprise states or nations. See J. Matthews, Revision of /LO Convention No. 107
(May 1988) (unpublished manuscript delivered at International Law Association Conference,
Australian National University).
50. J.P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LA w - LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 196 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984).
51. Id.
52. Wilson says, in 1968, the Organization for African Unity supported the territorial
integrity of Nigeria against the Biafran secessionist movement, because to do otherwise "would
set a dangerous precedent for the political unity of every African country." WILSON, supra
note 21, at 87. See also the discussion of the uti possidetis doctrine, which prevents the stability
of the new regime's borders being endangered in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986
1.C.J. Y.B. No. 40, at 161.
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ory, is the confusion or disjunction between law and current events
which is demonstrated by the fact that a blanket prohibition on the
rights of minorities seeking self-determination does not accord with
state practice. Certain minorities have either achieved self-determination, or are in the process of seeking it, often with international sanction and recognition, in spite of the conventional view. In recent
times, the instances of groups seeking and sometimes exercising their
right to determine their own future are rapidly increasing. International recognition for the claims of the Palestinians, s3 growing support for the recognition of the right to secedes4 by Slovenia and
Croatia, ss the Baltic states and perhaps even world response to the
plight of the Kurds indicate that state practice is slowly building to
support a shift in view, regardless of the fact that these examples are
usually rationalized as exceptions to the general rule. s6 For example,
President George Bush has referred to recognition of independence of
the Baltic States as being a "special case. "s 1
Events in Yugoslavia illustrate the changed state practice with
regard to recognized acts of self-determination, even prior to the appearance of the elements which normally constitute statehood. ss
Although it is impossible to be precise about the state of events in
Yugoslavia, it appears that as of this writing the U.s.,s9 Britain, 60
53. See, e.g., Res. ES-7/2: Question of Palestine (1980), reprinted in 18 DuSAN J. DJONOVITCH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: SERIES 1: GENERAL AssEMBLY 479 (1979 - 80).
54. A right which extends beyond the right simply of self-determination.
55. THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts
Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at AlO.
56. For an example see the view expressed in Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of
'People' in the African Charter on Humanitarian and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80, 90
(1988), that international recognition for Bangladesh only occurred because of "a set of circumstances that lent a cloak of legitimacy to what would otherwise be impermissible at international law."
57. David Hoffman, Baker Vows Aid for Soviets, Lists Five Principles for Dealings, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A34.
58. The 7th International Conference of American States - Convention on Rights and
duties of States, Dec. 3 - 26, 1933, art. l, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 75 (1934). Article l lists 4
elements: permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other States. Recognition also has an effect on statehood although controversy
remains as to whether its role is "constitutive" or "declaratory." See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET
AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988).
59. See THE AGE, July 4, 1991. See also John Mashek, Bush Edges Toward Recognizing
Ba/tics, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1991, at 12.
60. The British Prime Minister John Major was reported as saying, "it may no longer be
possible to hold the country together." THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also William Drozdiak,
Conflicts Over Yugoslav Crisis Sueface in Europe; Debate Pits Principle of Self-Determination
Against Preserving National Boundaries, WASH. POST, July 5, 1991, at Al5.
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Germany, 61 the European Community, 62 and Australia63 have indicated their readiness to recognize the declarations of independence by
Slovenia and Croatia. 64
The Baltics provide another example of the practice of states
shifting to support claims by minorities for self-determination. What
has been the response of the international community to their claims
of independence from Moscow? Events have moved with startling rapidity. Just over one year ago one state only, Iceland, had formally
recognized Lithuania's claim for independence. 65 Now recognition of
independence has been accorded by at least eighteen countries including Australia, plus the U.S. and the European Community. The President of the Russian Republic has issued a decree recognizing the
Baltic republics, as did the President of the defunct Soviet Union. 66
Even prior to these events Lithuania's claim had already attained
a certain degree of legitimacy from the international community. The
U.S. and Australia, among others, were reported as attempting to
pressure the Soviet Union into accepting Lithuania's declaration. 67
The U.S., adopting diplomatic means, postponed an important summit it had planned to hold with the Soviet Union. 68 The Soviet
Union's military response to the Lithuanian movement was condemned by the U.S., 69 Japan, 70 the European Community71 and Australia, 72 and threats were made to suspend aid. 73 It is clear, therefore,
that while Lithuania's right to self-determination had been recognized
61. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Drozdiak., supra note 60.
62. The European Community was reported to be ready to consider recognition if Belgrade refused to stop hostilities. THE AGE, July 4, 1991. See also Curtius, supra note 2S.
63. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991.
64. The European Community formally recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January 16,
1992. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1992. See also Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at AlO. It has also recognized Bosnia and
Herzegovina. See EC Grants Recognition to Bosnia and Herzegovina, THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Apr. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRNT File.
65. See GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1991. See also Debran Rowland, Lithuanians
Mark Independence Day, CHI. TRIB., Feb. lS, 1991, at 7.
66. See Martin Sieff, Yeltsin Now Calls the Shots, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at Al.
67. See THE AGE, Mar. 3, 1991. See also Daniel Sneider, Gorbachev Woos and Assails
West, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 9, 1991, at 3.
6S. See THE AGE, Jan. 30, 1991. See also Don Oberdorfer & Ann Devroy, Bush and
Gorbachev Postpone Summit, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1991, at Al.
69. See THE AGE, Mar. 17, 1991. See also U.S. on Secession: Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, June
2S, 1991, AS.
70. See THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 22, 1991. See also Martin Seiff, Violence Laid to
Gorbachev's Foes,W ASH. TIMES, May, 3, 1991, at AS.
71. See THE AGE, Jan. 23, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70.
72. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70.
73. See THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 22, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70.
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by only one state, many others have implicitly indicated that, at the
very least, they did not accept the Soviet Union's outright rejection of
the Lithuanian claim. At the most, the negative response of these
states can be interpreted as tacit approval of Lithuania's claim. If so,
further support is lent to the argument that examples of state practice
are incrementally building toward a re-examination of traditional
theory.
The proposal for the establishment of a safe haven for Kurdish
refugees from the Iraqi regime, regardless of whether it succeeds or
not, also lends support to a change in practice. The territorial integrity of Iraq was affected by the allies' action in establishing the enclave and subsequent recognition of the Kurdish claim for full
autonomy by the allies further confirms the allies' support of Kurdish
claims for self-determination. Although it is clear that protection of
the Kurds does not translate automatically into support for their right
to self-determination, the allied intervention ensures that the Kurdish
claim is kept alive, and may be a preliminary step necessary for the
attainment of that goal. In addition, a U.S. Military Report specifically recognized as an objective the attainment of a permanent, secure
and autonomous Kurdish region. 74 The Kurdish example indicates
that a "people," subject to alien domination not within defined colonial borders, have been allocated, with the sanction and active contrivance of three significant powers and the U.N., a safe haven or
enclave within the territory of another state. 75 A safe haven is clearly
one important element towards achieving a successful claim for selfdetermination.
In principle, acceptance of a right to limited self-government for
the Palestinian people has been recognized by Israel. 76 In view of the
fact that self-determination is about the process of allowing a group to
determine their political future, rather than any one particular result,
Israel's acceptance is significant.
Two final examples of the shift in state practice concern the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (C.S.F.R.) and Eritrea. C.S.F.R.
President Vaclav Havel has indicated that the Slovakian people have a

74. See THE AUSTRALIAN, May 5, 1991. See also Paper: U.S. May Seek Autonomous
Kurdish Region, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1991, at 19.
75. See GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Apr. 28, 1991. See also Paper: U.S. May Seek Autonomous Kurdish Region, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1991, at 19.
76. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1992. See also Norman Kempster & Daniel Williams, Israel
OKs Talks on Arab Self-Rule, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al.
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right to secede, as long as it is done in a constitutional manner. 77 Similarly, the new Ethiopian government has reportedly adopted a charter recognizing the right of self-determination for all its nationalities,
as long as the appropriate referendum is held, and has affirmed the
right of the Eritreans in the north of the state to secede. 78
The aforementioned examples do not confuse the political principle of self-determination with the legal right of self-determination, but
recognize the facts of self-determination. There is a large and growing
body of evidence indicating that the attitudes of the international
community towards the right of minorities to assert a claim for selfdetermination are changing. As the ICJ stated in the Nicaragua Case,
these facts constitute the most potent evidence of the state of customary international law. 79 If self-determination is to have any contemporary relevance, then, it must be taken to include the situation where
ethnic minorities may exercise this right.
2.

Textual Issues

An analysis of the texts which represent the conventional view of
self-determination also reveals that it is based on a circular argument.
It asserts that apart from States, trusts and non-self-governing territories or categories listed in Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, the right is
available only to those territories which possess a status similar to
that of a non-self-governing territory. Crawford, for example, offers
an additional rather vague category of situations, apart from the standard ones, where self-determination may also be relevant:
[Possibly] other territories forming distinct political geographical areas, whose inhabitants do not share in the government either of the
region or of the State to which the region belongs, with the result that
the territory becomes in effect . .. non-self-governing. 80

Similarly, Wilson believes that the right does not entail a right of secession from a self-governing state, "unless a part of that State has
become effectively non-self-governing with respect to the whole." 81
These arguments beg the critical question. Nowhere do they define how or when the territory in question becomes non-self-governing.
They merely answer the problems by restating it. What does becom77. See THE AGE, July 9, 1991. See also Mary Battiata, Separatist Slovaks Becoming
More Vocal in 'Family Feud' with Czechs, WASH. PosT, Mar. 19, 1991, at A21.
78. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Robert M. Press, Ethiopians Opt for Transition
to Democracy, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 5, 1991, at 1.
79. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 26.
80. Crawford, supra note 39, at 101 (emphasis added).
81. WILSON, supra note 21, at 87.
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ing "in effect non-self-governing" or "effectively non-self-governing"
mean? This is the crux of the whole self-determination issue, the need
to formulate a legal method for determining when a particular entity
has become "non-self-governing."
The deficiency of the conventional view is that by failing to formulate specific principles with which to assess a claim, it avoids the
most controversial aspect of the right to self-determination. This is
not an attack merely on the lack of clarity of the traditional view; the
"legality" of a right is not diminished or increased by the uncertainty
of its content. The conventional view is clear enough within a limited
scope, but it does not provide an explanation or guide for when the
right does arise beyond the traditional categories, categories which no
longer cover the varieties of groups seeking to exercise the right.

3.

Jurisprudential Issues

Assuming then that the conventional view of self-determination
theory is no longer appropriate, on the basis both of developing state
practice and inherent logical inconsistencies, it is interesting to consider how and why it has for so long been accepted. Furthermore,
why has that acceptance been accompanied by continual academic
controversy? The confusion of international opinion in this area is an
example of what one jurisprudential approach would call a "crisis" in
the "interpretive" community's "structure of beliefs." 82 This theory
asserts that change in law comes about when the exceptions to a general rule are too numerous to rationalize. A "crisis" in the law results
which can only be resolved by the reconciliation of the exceptions
under a new rule, which thus moderates or changes the original rule.
This reconciliation can only occur through an alteration in the community's belief structure and this happens when a sufficiently persuasive argument is formulated to explain the exceptions. In this
manner, the law gradually evolves and retains the illusion (often fostered in law schools) of being simultaneously "static and yet dynamic." For example, Katz explains the process by reference to
Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific change:
Discovery commences with the awareness of an anomaly . . . . It then
continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of the
anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been ad82. See, e.g., M.F. Katz, After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of Post-Structuralism,
24 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 51, 57 - 58 (1986).
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justed so that the anomalous has become the expected. 83

Academic opinion regarding self-determination is currently in a
state of "crisis." The profusion of debate reflects a period in which
there is an "extended exploration of the anomaly." Berman refers to
aspects of the debate as "the paradox of self-determination. " 84 The
mass of writing on the subject is evidence of the unsettled state of the
law. Crawford's usage of the word "possibly" to qualify the application of self-determination to territories outside conventional theories
only highlights the uncertainties. The recapitulation of the general
rule, and attempts to explain or rationalize exceptions under the general rule, are unconvincing. They do not accord with either legal or
political reality. There is a growing list of examples where a right to
self-determination has been recognized regardless of its failure to fit
conventional theoretical requirements. This list of examples includes
the Baltic States, Croatia and Slovenia, and recent Israeli statements
regarding a Palestinian right to limited self-government, to name a
few. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out that politically and legally certain entities have successfully asserted their right to self-determination while others continue to do so. What is needed in order
to resolve the "crisis" is a reformulation of the original rule. Otherwise, the factual exceptions cannot be reconciled.
It has been suggested here that there is an uncertainty in international law theory regarding when the right of self-determination applies; that this confusion has rendered the term incapable of
application to the wide variety of situations it is being called upon to
mediate; and, that reformulation of the conventional approach is necessary to reconcile factual exceptions. The controversial approach to
the interpretation of self-determination more accurately reflects current state practice, and should therefore be formally recognized as the
appropriate international law standard.

D.

Issues for the Future

Adoption of the controversial approach to self-determination will
undoubtedly be accompanied by a range of new and complex issues.
For example, the most serious of these problems is the potential effect
a successful bid for self-determination by a group in one state, may
have on a neighboring state which also contains the same grouping.
83. See id. at 56 (citing THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
90 (1967)).
84. N. Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7
WIS. INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1988).
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In this context, the Chinese have expressed concern over the effect
that independence for Kazakhstan may have over the large Kazakh
minority in the Xinjiang province. ss Serbs in the Croatian region of
Krajina will also pose a problem for any independent Croatian state. 86
Inter-ethnic rivalries within newly independent Soviet republics
also create serious problems for international stability. It is difficult
to keep abreast of the ever burgeoning list of minorities claiming
rights, often against an entity which itself has just successfully asserted its right to self-determination. The Ossetians in Georgia, the
self-proclaimed Dnieper Republic in Moldava and the Crimean autonomous republic in the Southern Ukraine87 are examples of just a
few claims by minorities within former minority entities.
Apart from a proliferation of claims which could result from the
adoption of the controversial view, the other major issue concerns the
area of implementation. How quickly and effectively can international and domestic constitutional law theory respond to the urgent
need to construct new forms of power sharing to accommodate the
proliferation of demands? Remembering that self-determination is
not necessarily synonymous with complete independence, the "shape"
of new forms of federal structures will be extremely important. The
formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its rapid replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States with as yet
undefined responsibilities in significant areas of economic and defense
control illustrates the need for some creative legal thinking on the
effect of self-determination on the constitutional structure of states.
Or will self-determination translate into the forms of power redistribution being experimented with in relation to indigenous peoples
in Canada, New Zealand and to a lesser extent Australia? For example, will Canada proceed with a proposal by the notedly conservative
Canadian Bar Association to introduce a separate system of justice for
native Canadians? Will the New Zealand experience of placing land
claims in a separate tribunal and allowing first offenders in the criminal justice system to be punished in consultation with Maori leaders
constitute new forms of effective self-government?
These and a host of other issues accompany a shift in international law to the more controversial approach to self-determination.
85. See Lena H . Sun, China Fears that Fever of Soviet Ethnic Conflicts Could Cross Border, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al6.
86. See Laura Silber et al., Serbian Leaders' Dispute Threatens UN Peace Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at 2.
87. See THE AGE, Sept. 7, 1991. See also Walter Laqueur, Independence May Enslave
Millions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, at M5.
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It is suggested here, however, that these questions should be incorporated into the criteria to be applied in assessing a claim, or resolved at
the domestic level, rather than automatically preventing the right
from being exercised. Otherwise, the term self-determination is in
danger of losing any useful currency it may have once possessed as a
principle of international law.

IV.

CONCLUSION

It has been argued here that conventional theoretical approaches
to self-determination are inadequate insofar as they provide neither a
description of, nor a prescription for, the behavior of states in international relations. To be useful to the field of international dispute resolution, international law theory should be functional, as well as
analytical. This is particularly true when we are witnessing an increasing number of claims by indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, not enclosed within the parameter of colonial boundaries, but
who nevertheless wish to exercise their right to self-determination, a
right which is part of international customary law. To date, the right
is denied on the basis that the group does not "fit" the theory. The
resulting dissonance between state practice and the conventional law
on self-determination has led to an unacceptable level of uncertainty
in the application of the law. A way out of this uncertainty has been
proposed, utilizing existing tools of the discourse, to improve and refine the current paradigm.
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